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Abstract 
This paper concerns the search for an appropriate model of paid parental leave for 
New Zealand. Seven models that employ different rationales and use different 
public law instruments are examined. My objective is to illustrate that the models 
are not substitutable alternatives and that careful examination of the effects of each 
is necessary before the adoption of mandatory paid leave. 
The paid leave model chosen must be mandatory, as our current voluntary employer 
provision model illustrates the inequities of voluntary provision. It must have a 
labour focus, as paid leave is aimed at resolving the conflict between work and 
family responsibilities rather than increasing maternal or child health. A social 
insurance model is a mandatory labour model that provides the most advantageous 
results for employees, employers and society, and is used extensively overseas. 
This paper advocates a particular social insurance scheme which requires 
contributions from employees, employers, and government. It provides effective, 
beneficial paid leave aimed at increasing equity between male and female workers, 
and should be adopted in New Zealand. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 14, 040 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Paid parental leave is a big political issue in New Zealand. For the past twenty five 
years it has been pushed aside as 'too hard' while other birth and employment issues 
have been grappled with. At present, a ' voluntary employer provision' model of paid 
leave is used in New Zealand, as paid leave is left for employees and employers to 
privately negotiate. As it has become apparent that paid leave is generally 
inaccessible to employees, and that many people cannot afford to take unpaid leave, 
pressure has grown for the introduction of mandatory paid leave in New Zealand. 
Such is the success of the "12 Weeks Paid Parental Leave Campaign" that polls put 
public support at 63 per cent (with only 29 per cent against), 1 and National , Labour 
and the Alliance have presented their own legislative solutions. 
Two private members ' bills have been put forward. Dianne Yates'2 bill to amend 
the Social Security Act 1964 and provide for welfare based payments has been 
languishing in the ballot box for two years.3 Laila Harre' s4 Paid Parental Leave Bill, 
an employer levy system, was introduced early in 1998 but was recently defeated on 
its second reading. 5 These bills served to further public debate and pressured the 
government to introduce their own provisions, the Taxation (Parental Tax Credit) 
Act 1999. 
However parental leave is more than a matter of political expediency. A wave of 
changes in employment, family and society have forced us to re-evaluate the way 
work and family are structured. Paid parental leave refers to renumerated or 
compensated leave from employment after the birth or adoption of a child. The key 
1 G Rasch and K Barnett Paid Parental Leave; Essential Information and Analysis of Impacts 
(Nelson Polytechnic, Nelson, 1998) 6. 
2 Labour Member for Hamilton East 
3 The Paid Parental Leave Bill 1997 
4 Alliance List MP; Paid Parental Leave Bill 1998, no I 02-1. 
5 It was defeated 60-58, despite two government supporters crossing the floor - Christine Fletcher, 
National MP for Epsom, and Ann Batten, Independent MP. Frank Grover of the Christian Heritage 
Party voted with the government. 
6 
objective is reconciling the conflicting demands of work and family life, and so the 
focus is not the health of the mother (although this is relevant), but bonding and 
adjusting to a new child.6 This means paid leave can be used by either parent. ln 
contrast, maternity or paternity leave is leave available exclusively for the mother or 
the father. Extended leave refers to the longer period of leave (generally unpaid) 
available to either parent for the purposes of caring for a young child. 
I have identified seven public law options for providing payment. Each impacts 
differently on society' s valuation of paid leave,7 and on labour, demographic, gender 
and race policies. lt is necessary for New Zealand to examine closely the effect each 
potential model will have on these areas before choosing the one which is the most 
appropriate. 
I believe that a social insurance scheme is the most appropriate for New Zealand. In 
particular, I advocate a model which requues contributions from employees, 
employers and the government. Such a model would provide for 12 weeks 
entitlement at 80 per cent of wages ( capped at the average male weekly wage), and 
could be run concurrently with the accident compensation scheme [ ACC]8 in a 
grander social insurance scheme. Social insurance is the best model as it recognises 
that paid leave is an employment right, but allows for the widest range of coverage 
by requiring that all employees, regardless of hours worked, pay a levy. Joint 
funding by employees, employers and government maximises the benefits of paid 
leave and spreads the costs amongst those who gain the benefits. 
This paper will explain why a mandatory labour model of paid leave is favoured, 
and why social insurance best provides this form of paid leave. It will then explore 
the advantages social insurance offers, which include increased labour participation, 
6 
"Perspectives; Parental Leave" [1997] International Labour Review 136, 109 OVID 014466371 
[Author and page numbers not given]. 
7 
Cass Sunstein Free Markets and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, l 997), 17. 
8 
ACC is governed by the Accident Insurance Act 1998. 
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treating people as individuals, and reduced discrimination. It will also examine the 
potential problems of such a system, including an increased bureaucracy, cost and 
race issues. Finally, it will examine the efficiency of social insurance using a law 
and economic analysis. Throughout, social insurance will be contrasted with the 
other six models I have identified - voluntary employer payment, mandatory 
employer payment, general taxation, tax credits, employer levy and disability 
insurance. To provide a context for the reader, I will begin by briefly stating the 
case for paid leave. 
II JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PAID PARENTAL LEAVE 
A Current Climate 
Paid parental leave has been pushed into prominence by the changes in work and 
family that have occurred over the last few decades. The traditional pattern of 
breadwinner and homemaker is being replaced by dual-earner families, spurred by 
economic need, contemporary job uncertainties, and women' s desire for 
independence.9 At the same time, there is an emphasis on community care for the 
elderly or sick. Increasingly, the workforce is composed of women and men with 
responsibilities for both the care and economic support of families who seek a 
balance between their work and private lives. Traditional organisational structures 
do not accommodate this; 10 
Jobs were designed for full-time working men with full-time wives at home. Although 
women are overtaking men in the workforce and technology has changed hugely, 
working patterns are little different. 
9 
Suzan Lewis "Rethinking Employment: An Organisational Culture Change Framework" in Suzan 
Lewis and Jeremy Lewis (eds) The Work-Family Challenge: Rethinking Employment (Sage 
Publications, London, 1986) 2-3 . For a New Zealand context, see Simon Nash Families and Paid 
Work: The Legislative l11terface a11d C'11rre11t Policy Direcho11s in Aotearoa New Zealand (Social 
Policy Research Unit, Palmerston North, 1997) 1-10. 
10 
"Perspectives: Parental Leave" above n 3. 
8 
Employer organisations are also changing, focusing on greater productivity and a 
workplace which responds quickly to new technology and fluctuating markets. The 
rationalisation of workplaces increases flexibility, but at the same time creates 
uncertainties and reduces employees ' ability to manage their personal lives. Lewis 
argues that a new psychological contract has been established, whereby workers no 
longer expect jobs for life, but do expect opportunities for self-development, 
including the opportunity to better balance work and family.11 
B Current Law 
New Zealand's current leave provisions are increasingly inappropriate in the light of 
these changes. The Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 [the 
PLEP] allows for unpaid leave from paid work at the time of the birth or adoption of 
a child. Mothers receive 14 weeks of maternity leave, and fathers or male partners 
two weeks, which must be taken in one continuous period.12 Extended leave for up 
to 52 weeks is available for either or both partners in one continuous period. 13 
Mothers are also eligible for ten days special leave during pregnancy. 14 Eligibility 
criteria restrict leave to those who have worked at least ten hours a week for the 
same employer for at least 12 months. 15 The employee' s job is then protected for 
four weeks and for any further period of leave, except where the employer can prove 
it is a ' key position ' or where redundancy occurs. 16 
11 
Lewis, above n 9, 2-3. Shell International "Leave Options; Policy" 
<http://sww.sonz.shell.co.nz/hr/familywork/leaveoptions .htm > (last modified 27 August 1999); 
Miriam Scott "Downsizing Firms Place Extra-Value on Work and Family Programs" (1993) 48 
Employee Benefit Plan Rev 28 [OVID 00739412]. 
12 9 Parental Leave and Employment Act 1987 ss 9, 1 . 
13 
Parental Leave and Employment Act 1987 ss 26, 27. 
14 
Parental Leave and Employment Act 1987 s 15. 
15 
Parental Leave and Employment Act 1987 ss 7, 17, 23 ; and the employee must have resumed work 
from an earlier parental leave more than 12 months previously (s 6). 
16 
Parental Leave and Employment Act 1987 s 4 . 
9 
The PLEP is inadequate as increasing economic pressure and the reliance on dual 
incomes mean that unpaid leave is not feasible for many people.17 The employment 
position of women causes difficulties are many are in non-standard employment 
which is excluded by the provisions.18 The ' key position' and redundancy 
exemptions have left exploitable loopholes for employers. A 1994 Department of 
Labour survey indicated knowledge and use of PLEP provisions is low.19 While 83 
per cent of parents qualified for leave, only 66 per cent of eligible women and 43 per 
cent of eligible men used parental leave.20 If the household income was below 
$30,000, both mothers and fathers were less likely to take leave. Workers were also 
less likely to take parental leave if they were the main household income eamer. 21 
C The International Law Framework 
The PLEP has also been surpassed by international developments. The 1994 
European Community Pregnant Workers Directive required all members to provide 
universal access to maternity leave at a high rate of payment. Over 135 countries 
now have mandatory paid parental leave, with the United States (with the exception 
of five states) and New Zealand the only OECD countries not doing so. There are 
also many international conventions that support paid leave. 
Article 11 (2)(b) of the United National Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) binds states to take all appropriate 
means to introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits 
17 Arielle Harman Grill "The Myth of Unpaid Family Leave: Can the United States Implement a Paid 
Leave Policy Based on the Swedish Model" (1995-6) Comp L J 373, 382. 
18 This is explored in section IV (B)(2) of the paper. 
19 quoted in National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women [NACEWJ Report on Parental 
Leave (NACEW, Wellington, 1997) 17. ["NA CEW Report on Parental Leave"] 
20 Under the definition of ' parental leave' in the PLEP, this includes maternity, paternity or extended 
leave, so most of the men regarded as taking leave in this statistic would have taken less than two 
weeks leave under the paternity provisions. 
2 1 This is supported by United States research. Ministry of Women' s Affairs "Paid Parental Leave Bill; 
Additional Official Advice at the Request of the Social Services Committee" (Wellington, 10 March 
1999) 6 [" Additional Official Advice "]. 
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without loss of employment, seniority or social benefits. New Zealand has ratified 
CEDA W, but has lodged reservations on two issues, including Article 11 (2)(b ). 
The Committee' s latest report on New Zealand stated:22 
The Committee expressed its serious concern at the continuing existence of a 
reservation to Article 11 (2)(b) on paid maternity leave. It was concerned that the 
requirement for women to negotiate maternity leave individually with their employers, 
rather than being established as a matter of national law and policy, was a disadvantage 
for New Zealand women. It was also concerned about the constraints for obtaining 
unpaid maternity leave and the low awareness by women of existing unpaid parental 
leave rights. 
A number oflntemational Labour Organisation (TLO) Conventions also apply. ILO 
Convention 103 ( 1952)23 calls on member nations to provide, by law, 12 weeks 
maternity leave, with cash benefits from a compulsory insurance scheme or public 
funds . Payment is to be at two-thirds or more of the woman 's earnings and 
employers are not to be individually liable for these costs. TLO Recommendation 
No 95 (1952)2
4 
recommends extending the paid leave period to 14 weeks, and 
paymg 100 per cent of the women ' s previous earnings. 36 States have ratified 
Convention 103, but New Zealand has not. 
ILO Convention 156 ( 1981 )25 is concerned with equal opportunities and equal 
treatment for male and female employees. It commits signatories to develop 
community services for working parents and to provide infonnation and education 
to promote wider understanding of the problems facing workers with family 
responsibilities. Again, New Zealand has not ratified this convention. 
Article 10(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides that special protection be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period 
before and after birth. During such period working mothers should receive paid 
leave or leave with adequate social security benefits. New Zealand has ratified this 
22
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 19th 
Session, (Geneva, 22 June-10 July 1998) CEDAW/C/1998/lll/ADD9. 
23
C 103 - Convention Concerning Maternity Protection (Revised 1952). 
24
R 95 - Recommendation Concerning Maternity Protection ( 1952). 
25
C 156 - Workers with Family Respohsibilities Convention (1981 ). 
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Covenant, but the effectiveness of Article 10(2) is limited by Article 2, which 
requires states to implement the Covenant to the maximum of their available 
resources with a view to achieving full realisation of the rights. The CEDA W 
Committee has attempted to point out that l\f ew Zealand cannot excuse itself by 
Article 2 if it compares itself to nations at a similar level of development. 
D Justifications for Paid Parental Leave 
Providing mandatory paid leave is about more than meeting international obligations 
and achieving a politically expedient result. While paid leave can have many 
objectives, the benefits of paid leave take on four main strands - equity, health, 
benefits to employers and social responsibility. 
I Equity 
Paid leave increases equity between male and female workers. Taking 'time out' 
from employment to give birth is the main reason women are off work, and it 
creates a sizeable gap in overall earnings between men and women. 26 American 
studies have indicated the relative earnings loss experienced by women after 
childbirth is NZ$8118, increasing to $9367 in the second year, and $4996 in the 
third year. Women who did not have access to leave but left work for a period 
experienced an average drop in hourly rates of NZ$1.18 in the first year after their 
child' s birth, and had an increased probability of becoming unemployed. 27 This 
was not experienced by women who had taken paid leave. 28 
Parents in employment who cannot negotiate any better conditions may be forced into 
lower status, insecure, casual and part-time work where there are limited career 
26 Ministry of Women' s Affairs Parental Leave Policies; Women and the Labour Markel; 
Comparative Analysis of New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Uni led States and Australia 
(Ministry of Women ' s Affairs, Wellington, 1995) 64-65 . ["Parental Leave Policies; Women and the 
labour Market"]. 
27 
Parental Leave Policies; Women and the Labour Market above n 26, 64-65 . This is supported by 
British studies which, even after controlling for actual work experience and part-time job status, found 
that at age 23 women earn 82% of male earnings, but at age 33 mothers' earnings fell to 64% of men's 
and non mothers earnings rose to 84% of men's. "Additional Information" above n 21 , 6. 
28 
Ministry of Women ' s Affairs "Briefing to the Government" (Wellington, 1996), quoted in Nash, 
above n 9, 10. 
opportunities. Alternatively, they may leave employment, and be classified as a 
'dependent' , despite being engaged daily in long hours of productive activities which 
add value to the economy. 
12 
The gap in earnings has further effects, such as increasing the burden of students 
loans and saving for one' s retirement, and perpetuates the idea of women as 
marginal workers. 
In contrast, the main reason that men are off work is injury, which is covered by 
ACC (and now private health providers), a mandatory social insurance/disability. 
insurance scheme. 
29 
In fact, 70 per cent of all ACC injury payments are to men. 30 
Paid leave increases equity between women by ensuring that all have the choice to 
take leave without being penalised because of their financial position. The two 
groups of women who currently return earliest to work are highly paid ' career' 
women, and low paid women who cannot afford to remain off work. 31 Those with 
high family incomes tend to delay their return longer. Hofferth found that in 
America, "[h]aving access to a flexible spending amount (from which to pay for 
childcare) and access to liberal leave were associated with returning to work full-
time".32 Those who return to work for financial necessity in New Zealand are more 
likely to be young mothers, and Maori and Pacific Islanders.33 
2 Health 
The investment of time paid leave allows has health benefits for babies and parents. 
Under financial pressure, the caregiver may return to work sooner, and be forced to 
cease or interrupt breastfeeding. Studies show the importance of the initial 
29 
I will examine these terms more fully in Part lll when the models are outlined. 
30 
Susan Iverson and Dr Rose Ryan "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Paid 
Parental Leave Bill 1998" (103) 1. 
31 
Sandra L Hofferth "Effects of Public and Private Policies on Working After Childbirth" (1996) 23 
Work and Family 378, [OVID 1326096] [Page number not given]. 
32Hofferth, above n 31.0 
33 
Judith Galtry Women Work and Breastfeeding in New Zealand; Background Paper (Victoria 
University, Wellington, 1998) 8-9. This is supported by United States statistics about Black women. 
Hofferth, above n 31. 
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cognitive and interpersonal development period34 and the long-term benefits of 
breastfeeding for a minimum of 12 weeks, in~luding significantly lower rates of 
childhood illnesses and death. 35 Breastfeeding also has health benefits for mothers. 36 
Returning to work earlier than desired, combined with the stress of adjusting to a 
baby and perhaps ceasing breastfeeding, will increase the stress on new parents. 37 
The inability to gain health benefits by those unable to take leave will perpetuate 
inequality. Returning to paid employment was the main reason given by Pacific. 
Islands mothers in New Zealand for ceasing breastfeeding in the early weeks and 
months following delivery.38 Pacific Islands and Maori women are over-represented 
in low income groups, and their children in low child health statistics. 39 Increased 
child illness and parental stress that may follow returning to work earlier than is 
desirable will be borne disproportionately by these groups and will reinforce existing 
patterns of disadvantage.40 
34 New Zealand College of Midwives "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Paid 
Parental Leave Bill 1998", 1; Bamardo's "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the 
Paid Parental Leave Bill 1998" (62) 1, quoting Carnegie Foundation Starting Points: Meeting the 
Needs of Our Youngest Children (Carnegie Foundation, New York, 1994) 23 . 
35 Judith Galtry Women, Work and Breastfeeding; Report to the Ministry of Women 's Affairs on the 
Conference on Women, Work and Breastfeeding, Manila 1998 (VUW, Wellington, 1998) I 0 
[" Women, Work and Breastfeeding'l- The American Academy of Paediatrics stated in 1997 that 
research for developed countries showed that breastfeeding decreases the incidence of a number of 
diseases and infections, including bacterial meningitis, and may have protective effects against sudden 
infant death syndrome, insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, and allergic diseases. Breastfeeding has 
also been linked to possible enhancement of cognitive development. "Breastfeeding and the Use of 
Human Milk" ( 1997) 100 Paediatrics 103 5. 
36 Judith Galtry "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Paid Parental Leave Bill 
1998" ( 49), 6. 
37 
National Council of Women "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Paid 
Parental Leave Bill 1998" (71 A), 8. 
38 
C Essex, P Smale and D Geddis "Breastfeeding Rates in New Zealand in the First Six Months and 
Reasons for Stopping" NZ Medical Journal 108, 355-357 in Women, Work and Breastfeeding above n 
33 , 20. 
39 
Mana News (Radio New Zealand, 24 September 1999, 6.40am). 
40 
Judith Galtry "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Paid Parental Leave Bill 
1998" (49), 5. 
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3 Benefits to employers 
Paid leave benefits employers through an increased return to work, decreased 
retraining costs, improved productivity, and reduced workplace stress. 41 New 
Zealand companies, such as Shell Services International, have recognised that even 
where the employer provides paid leave, the cost will almost always be less than that 
of replacing the employee.42 Positive from health effects such as reduced stress and 
lower childhood illness and death will also benefit employers. Galtry presents 
evidence showing absentee rates are seven times lower among mothers of babies fed 
on breastmilk that mothers of babies fed on infant formula. 43 
The European Community have stressed the benefits of retaining parents as 
employees and also noted that; 44 
. .. [T]aking leave to enhance family responsibilities may enhance the performance of 
many employees when they return to work, not only because they feel more committed 
and less stressed, but because caring for children develops generally applicable skills and 
qualities . 
./ Social benefits 
Child-rearing is a social good. Paid leave recognises the role of parents in society45 
and helps reduce the stress on individuals and families . This lowers parental and 
child health problems, which may encourage the development of healthier, well-
adjusted children. Society benefits as a higher rate of return to work by caregivers 
41 NACEW above n 19, 3. 
42 Shell ' s analysis showed an approximate savings of$50,000 for every $16,000 spent (for 3 months of 
paid leave at a salary of$65,000). Shell New Zealand and Shell Services International (NZ) Ltd, EEO 
Tmst "Work and Family Award~" Enhy (1999) 9, also see The Corporate Leadership Council 
Turning the Tide: The Role of Human Resources in Managing Employee Retention (Corporate 
Advisory Board, Washington, 1990) 4-5 . 
43 Women, Work and Breastfeeding, above n 33 , 12. 
«rhe European Commission 1994 in Dunedin Community Law Centre "Submission to the Social 
Services Select Committee on the Paid Parental Leave Bill 1998", 4. 
45 
Women's Rights Committee "Report of the Women's Rights Committee" [1975] AJHR 1.13, 
15 
in turn increases the performance of employees,46 reduces government expenditure 
lf: 47 · on we are, increases family income and consequent tax take, allows full 
utilisation of human potential, and reduces the likelihood of benefit dependence and 
resulting cycles of disadvantage.48 
Ill THE MODELS 
Paid leave operates in many distinct ways throughout the world, as states seek to 
achieve different objectives through diverse welfare and employment structures.49 
I have identified seven 'pure' models which differ in their rationale and their 
structures. These are: social insurance; general taxation; employer levy; tax credits; 
voluntary employer provision; mandatory employer provision; and disability 
insurance. I will briefly outline the features and rationale of each model, and 
contrast them throughout the remainder of the paper. 
A Outlines of the Models 
Social insurance, the model I believe most appropriate, involves a payment to a 
central fund by employers and or employees and the government. The fund may 
have multiple uses. The rationale is that paid leave is an employment right, 
important to improve equity between male and female workers, and that people 
should contribute towards their own welfare. Approximately 72 of the 135 
countries that have some form of paid leave, including most of the European Union, 
use a social insurance model. 
In the general taxation model, the government provide paid leave out of general 
revenue. Like social insurance it involves payment from a central fund, but because 
46 The European Commission 1994 in Dunedin Community Law Centre "Submission to the Social 
Services Select Committee on the Paid Parental Leave Bill 1998", 4. 
47 NACEW, above n 19, 4. 
48 NACEW, above n 19, 4. 
49 NACEW, above n 19, 4. 
16 
being sourced purely from the government it is easier to administer. General 
taxation treats childrearing as a social good which society should support, rather 
than as an employment right. General taxation is based on increasing equity for low-
income families, recognising social benefits, and agency theory (that on behalf on 
children, the State provides an incentive for parents to act in their children's best 
interests).50 It is currently used in Australia.51 Despite the rejection of general 
taxation by a Government Working Party in 1987,52 the Labour Party advocates this 
model for New Zealand. 53 
The Alliance promotes an employer levy model, which builds a central fund from 
the contributions of employees. The rationale is that paid leave is an employment 
right which employers should provide. Employers pay a payroll levy for all 
employees54 to avoid over-burdening small businesses and prevent discrimination in 
the hiring of women. Employees taking leave will generally be paid by their 
employer, and the employer can claim this back from the consolidated fund. This is 
used in France. 
Tax credits are supported by National and apply in New Zealand from 1 October 
through the Taxation (Parental Tax Credit) Act 1999. Overseas, tax credits are 
generally used in conjunction with other models. Tax cuts aim to increase the net 
income of a recipient by declaring segments of an individual ' s income tax free for a 
specified period. The parental tax credit in New Zealand provides a credit of up to 
$150 a week, per child, for eight weeks after birth. It is only available for workers 
with a family income of less than $37,450. The rationale is espoused by ACT MP 
Patricia Schnauer;55 
50 Working Party Report of the Working Party on Payment for Parental Leave (Department of 
Labour, Wellington, 1986) 10. 
51 Australia provides a one-off payment to new parents. State employees and most unionised 
employees also receive paid leave. 
52 Working Party, above n 50, 21. 
53 Dr Mrchael Cullen (20 May 1999) 577, NZPD, 16652. 
54 Under Barre' s Paid Parental Leave Bill this would have been $1 .50 -$1 .85 on average per employee. 55 (20 May 1999), 577, NZPD, 16652. 
The best way to help families in New Zealand is to leave them with more of their own 
money .. .I do not think there is any doubt in the world that housewives can spend a 
family budget better than the Government can. 
17 
Voluntary employer provision is New Zealand's current model, and is also used in 
most of the United States. Paid leave is left for employers and employees to 
negotiate privately. Proponents argue that mandated leave models interfere with the 
free operation of the labour market; if the benefits of paid leave outweigh the 
associated costs, workers and firms will voluntarily agree to it's provision. 56 
Mandatory employer provision is intended to solve the coverage problems of 
voluntary provision by requiring all employers to provide minimum levels of paid 
leave. The rationale is that employers gain the benefit of retaining employees, thus 
they, not the government should provide the entitlement. Mandatory payment is 
required as the market does not have perfect information and the ' positive 
extemalities' 57 of childcare will not be properly calculated by those negotiating 
58 contracts. In reality, a government may implement this model to meet 
international or domestic pressure without committing government money. 
Mandatory employer provision is used in Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Fiji and Indonesia. It is occasionally mixed with other models, such as in 
Denmark, where the employer pays the first two weeks of the leave and then a pure 
social insurance model is used. 
Disability insurance is perhaps the most unusual model. It requires the employer or 
employee to purchase disability insurance that will recompense the worker during 
parental or sick leave. Two rationales are apparent. One is the non-involvement of 
government and an emphasis on private provision of welfare. 59 The second and 
56 This argument is summarised by: Christopher Ruhrn The Economic Consequences of Parental 
Leave Mandates in Europe and North America (National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge 
MA, 1996) 3-4. ["Economic Consequences of Parental Leave "]; and Christopher Ruhrn and 
Jackqueline Teague Parental Leave Policies in Europe and North America (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge MA, 1995) 5, ["Parental l eave Policies" ]. 
57 
A positive extemality arises whenever an individual's actions increase the welfare of another who 
therefore benefits without contributing anything. 
58The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave above n 56, 3. 
59 
A key part of US welfare ideology. See Grill, above n I 7, 385 . 
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most important stems from a series of US cases, where some feminists sought to 
have the exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance declared sex 
discrimination.60 While disability insurance illustrates attempts to gain benefits for 
women through available means, it also reflects a ' same treatment' model of 
equality; namely that pregnancy is analogous to other temporary conditions causing 
work absences, and that specific paid parental or maternal leave reduces women's 
opportunities in the workplace.61 Disability insurance is controversial as pregnancy 
is equated with illness and disability. 
Outwardly, social insurance and disability insurance appear similar - the scheme 
advocated in this paper would include ACC, and thus have a similar coverage to 
disability insurance. The main difference is that disability insurance works through 
private providers who will need to make a profit and recoup marketing costs, and 
consequently will charge higher premiums. Private providers are also outside the 
immediate control of government, making standardisation and enforcement of 
payments more difficult. 
Pure insurance based schemes are relatively rare. Five United States states 
(California, New Jersey, Hawaii, New York and Rhode Island) and Puerto Rico use 
this. California and Rhode Island are entirely funded by employee contributions and 
no scheme is sourced entirely from employers. 
B A Favoured Model of Social Insurance 
These seven models are 'pure' - in reality many countries combine models or 
operate several simultaneously. I advocate a particular form of social insurance, 
which would require contributions from employees, employers and the government, 
60 Geluldig v Aiello (1974) 417 US 484 ; General Electric v Gilbert (1976) 429 US 125; Newport 
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v EEOC (1983) 669 US 462. These cases were unsuccessful in 
the Supreme Court until due to public pressure, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
1978 which defined ' sex' as including pregnancy. Herma Hill Kay "Equality and Difference: The Case 
of Pregnancy" [1985] Berkeley Women' s L J 1, 1-10. 
6 1 This is explored later in the paper. Richard Delgado and Helen Leskovoc "The Politics of 
Workplace Reforms: Recent Books on Parental Leave and a Father-Daughter Dialogue" (1987-88) 40 
Rut L R 1031 , 1033 . There are many arguments against this. See for example Kay, above n 60, 37. 
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m recognition that these groups share the benefits of mandatory parental leave. 
Contributions would be made to a central fund, which would also receive ACC 
levies,
62 
and perhaps superannuation. 12 weeks paid leave entitlement at 80 per cent 
of wages, capped at the average male weekly wage, would be available to either 
parent ( or another designated caregiver). 
I Why 12 Weeks? 
12 weeks is the optimum paid leave duration at the present time, for health, 
economic and political reasons. 
It has been suggested that 12 weeks is the minimum time necessary to establish the 
health benefits of paid leave.63 This is unclear whether this is the case. 12 weeks of 
paid leave is the minimum duration ILO Convention 103 requires,64 although the 
ILO recommends 14 weeks be provided by states.65 However, WHO/UNICEF and 
the now defunct New Zealand Public Health Commission have recommended a 
period of six months exclusive breastfeeding to optimise health benefits. 66 
12 weeks may also ensure the maximum economic benefits from paid leave. There 
is some indication that even where employers pay a levy for every employee (not 
only women), women 'pay' for intermediate and longer paid leave periods by 
receiving lower wages. The wage differentials for lengths of paid leave were -1.5 per 
cent for 14-26 weeks, and -2.9 per cent for 26+ weeks.67 The same studies show 
that where leave is for 13 weeks or less, mandated paid leave actually raises wages 
(by approximately 1. 1 % ) for women. This is because employers suffer fewer costs 
from short periods of paid leave (for example, other employees may do the extra 
work) and employees gain substantial benefits, allowing employment to increase 
62 
This would require ACC to be the monopoly provider of accident insurance again, which Labour 
has pledged to do if re-elected. 
63 
Laila Harre, "Paid Parental Leave" Speech at Victoria University, 21 April 1999. 
64 
C 103 - Convention Concerning Maternity Protection (Revised 1952) art 4. 
65 
R 95 - Recommendation Concerning Maternity Protection (1952). 
66 
Women, Work and Breastfeeding above n 33, 27. 
67 
The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave above n 56, 25. 
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without negative effects on wages. Longer entitlement prov1S1ons are likely to 
involve more costs for companies, may fail to provide sufficient benefits to workers 
to compensate this, and could also lead to the depreciation of employees' skills, 
meaning that wages will decline.68 
Perhaps the main reason 12 weeks is the preferred duration for paid leave is that it 
has been accepted by the majority of the New Zealand public.69 The "12 Weeks 
Paid Leave" campaign has spearheaded the issue since 1994, and a 12 week 
entitlement was vigorously publicised in the debate regarding Harre' s bill. Some 
countries offer paid leave for six months or more, and this may be a more optimal 
duration, but 12 weeks is consistent with New Zealand's current provisions and is at 
present, more politically and economically feasible .. 
IV THE BENEFITS OF A MANDATORY LABOUR MODEL FOR NEW 
ZEALAND 
Social insurance is the most appropriate model for New Zealand for several reasons. 
First, it recognises that paid leave is an employment right and has a labour rationale. 
Second, it is a mandatory labour model; and third, of the mandated labour models it 
provides the greatest societal coverage. In this part of the paper I will illustrate why 
a mandatory labour model is necessary and the reasons for preferring the social 
insurance model. 
A Employment Right 
The seven models broadly divide into those with a labour rationale (that leave is an 
employment right), and those with a welfare rationale (that the benefits of a parent 
having time off work with a new baby is a social good). The labour models are 
social insurance, employer levy, mandatory and voluntary employer provision, and 
68 
The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave above n 56, 27. 
69 
In the House debates for the Taxation (Parental Tax Credit) Act 1999, NZ First argued for a 12 
month leave entitlement, but no other party support this. Robyn McDonald (NZ First list MP) (20 
May 1999) 577, NZPD, 16655. 
21 
disability insurance. General taxation and tax credits are welfare orientated. Labour 
models restrict entitlement to those in the workforce, and maintain this distinction 
through employment based criteria, for example, requiring employees to meet 
minimum service criteria. Welfare models offer payment to all people as a right. 
To make such a payment feasible however, they may use targeting, thresholds, or 
other entitlement criteria. 
Paid leave is an employment rights issue that exists at the convergence of a 
caregiver's right to paid employment and equal access to the labour market, and a 
child ' s right to have adequate care.70 The crucial factor of the right to paid 
employment means paid leave must be seen as a employment right and structured 
accordingly. The rights approach of welfare is flawed. If welfare models provide 
paid leave as a right because three months at home is proved to be socially 
beneficial, there is an anomaly with other socially beneficial behaviours which are 
not promoted by such incentives, such as exercise. If welfare models promote paid 
leave because parents should take leave, the legislators are attempting to enforce 
values that many may disagree with. 71 
B Entitlement 
To be effective, the labour model adopted for paid leave needs to be mandatory. 
The voluntary employer provision model currently used proves the inequities and 
ineffectiveness of a voluntary regime. Far from allowing individuals the freedom to 
negotiate appropriate leave entitlements, leave is under-provided. 
70 
The ILO see the welfare of a child as the key objective of a paid leave scheme, but is careful to point 
out that caregiving may be fulfilled by either parent, as opposed to child-bearing. This is explored later 
in section VI (C) . International Labour Organisation Maternity Protection at Work: Revision of the 
Maternity Protection C'on11entio11 (1953) Report T'(l) (International Labour Office, Geneva, 1999) 
100. 
71 
Compare the rights based analysis of work and domestic responsibilities in Shelly Wright "Economic 
Rights and Social Justice: A Feminist Analysis of Some International Human Rights Conventions" 
[1992] A Y Int L 241 ,249. 
As Laila Harre said in the House:72 
Others will argue that the market will provide. The market will no more provide 
universal paid parental leave than it provided equal pay for equal work. It is simple fact 
- women do not have the market power to get it. 
I Market power 
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The Employment Contracts Act 1991 has established a system of individualised 
contracts that require employees to negotiate employment conditions with their 
employer. 73 As is explored later, most New Zealand women are not in work 
situations that encourage the negotiation of favourable contracts. Women are over-
represented in a limited number of occupations which are primarily in hard to 
organise areas (such as small businesses and part-time work). 74 When provision is 
left to the market, employers, acting in their (perceived) economic self-interest, will 
generally offer paid leave to less replaceable, more highly skilled employees; a 
limited, elite group of people. They may offer other employees paid leave as a 
loyalty incentive, in which case it is generally only available after an extremely long 
time, and at a low level of payment. 75 
Even where women are unionised and paid leave has been part of the industrial 
relations framework,76 unions have had difficulty in ensuring entitlement to even 
one or two weeks paid leave. 77 Sometimes, paid leave may be successfully 
negotiated but presented as ' company policy', rather than an employment contract 
72 ( 9 September 1998) 571 , NZPD, 11866. 
73 h, Nas above n 9, 1-3, 27. 
74 
Laura Bennett "Women and Enterprise Bargaining; The Legal and Institutional Framework" in 
Margaret Thornton Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
1995) 113-120. 
75 
See for example the contracts of Chapman Tripp Sheffield Young, PriceWaterhouse Coopers and 
KMPG in Appendix One. 
76 
Paid leave has often been ignored by unions in the past. See "Women and Enterprise Bargaining" 
above n 74, 142; and see generally F Baldwin and S Wapole Women, Affirmative Ac/ion, and 
Industrial Democracy (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987). 
77 
National Distribution Union "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Parental 
Leave Bill 1998", 5; and Finsec (Financial Sector Union) "Submission to the Social Services Select 
Committee on the Paid Parental Leave Bill" 1998, J 1. 
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provision, leaving it vulnerable to change by the employer at any stage. 78 The result 
is that under voluntary employer provision only a minority of people, 39 per cent, 
receive any length of paid leave, as the table that follows shows. Of these, a number 
receive only a token payment. 
Table One: Current Contract Provisions in New Zealand 
Under a Voluntary Employer Provision Model 
Type of Contract Payment Available No Payment Employees Covered79 
All contracts 39% 61% 388,300 
Private sector 17% 83% 222,500 
Govt. core services 79% 21% 135,200 
Govt. trading (SOE) 63% 37% 10,400 
Local Govt. - Core 3% 97% 13,300 
Local Govt. - Trading 3% 97% 700 
As seen here, the majority of payments are in the public sector. For most 
government departments, the entitlement is a one-off payment equal to six weeks 
pay, six months after the return to work, although much of the public sector 
entitlement is being whittled away. 80 Private sector companies have been 
introducing paid leave since the mid 1990s, but providers are generally large, 
national organisations, who offer it to their senior staff. 81 Secretaries and other non-
professional staff are often not covered. 
78 For example the Bank of New Zealand ' s well-publicised paid leave policy is not an employment 
contract provision. 
79 The figures come from an analysis of leave provisions in 3475 contracts (covering 416,000 
employees in the private and public sectors) by R Harbridge }.,rnployment Contracts: Bargaining 
Trends and Employment Law Update 1996 7 (Industrial Relations Centre, VUW, Wellington, 1997) in 
Rasch and Barnett, above n 1, 21 . 
80 
Association of Staff in Tertiary Education "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on 
the Paid Parental Leave Bill" (55) 2-3 . 
81 
For example, Bell Gully allows female senior associates and partners 3 months paid leave, Chapman 
Tripp allows male and female partners and principals 3 months, and other professional staff2 weeks to 
3 months after two years service, Russell McVeagh offer female lawyers 3 months. See Appendix 
One. 
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2 Defining "employee" 
Mandatory Jabour models seek to avoid these inequities by mandating payment for 
all employees. Social insurance and other labour models provide entitlements to 
those in the paid workforce and will impose conditions on length of service and 
hours worked in order to maintain this distinction. In contrast, welfare based 
schemes will be aimed at all mothers (and sometimes all parents), regardless of 
employment status. 
To maintain the labour/welfare distinction however, labour models define 
' employee' with eligibility criteria. The current PLEP requirements are similar to 
those used overseas, and are based on ensuring the employer has gained benefits 
from the worker suitable to justify an unpaid leave period. The PLEP defines an 
employee as " ... any person of any age employed by an employer to do any work for 
hire or reward, but does not include an independent contractor".82 Unpaid leave is 
only available to employees who have worked for at least ten hours per week for the 
same employer for more than 12 months, and who have not returned from a prior 
parental leave period within the last 12 months. 
These criteria ignore the reality of women ' s employment in New Zealand and the 
effect of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.83 Women are more likely than men 
to be engaged in non-standard forms of work, and are thus over-represented in the 
groups excluded - part-timers, new employees and those working several jobs. For 
example, 37.2 per cent of all women in the labour force are part-time workers 
compared with 10.6 per cent of men.84 141 ,000 women will be excluded by the 10 
82 
Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 s 2. 
83 For an analysis of the changes this has brought see Linda Hill and Rosemary Du Pleiss "Tracing the 
Similarities; Identifying the Differences: Women and the Employment Contracts Act" (1993) 18 NZ J 
of IR 38, and Ann Else False F.conomy (Tandem Press, North Shore, 1995). 
84 
That is, 16.5% of the total labour force are female part-time workers, compared with 5.9% who are 
male part-time workers). Household Labour Force Suivey (March 1998) quoted in Council of Trade 
Unions "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Paid Parental Leave Bill 1998" 
(45) 14. 
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hour a week criterion,85 yet many women have no choice but to work part-time 
because of care issues. 86 
In addition, women are almost three times more likely than men to have more than 
one job; 24,500 women compared to 9,900 men in 1996-1997.87 As the eligibility 
criteria count only the hours worked for one employer, these women are excluded. 
Because eligibility criteria are employer focused, difficulties occur with those who 
are self-employed or who are contractors, and the PLEP simply excludes these 
groups. 
These figures illustrate that non-standard employment is the reality for many women 
in New Zealand. These women are less likely to be covered by the common 
eligibility criteria of mandatory labour models, and less likely to be able to negotiate 
coverage under voluntary labour models. A government focus on flexibility in 
labour relations and control by market forces88 is increasing this. The result is an 
iniquitous situation between women who are highly educated and well-placed in the 
job market and are likely to be offered and to qualify for paid leave, and low-skilled 
marginalised workers, who will not. 
3 Broadening entitlement 
Social insurance can avoid these problems. By requmng contributions from 
employees and the government as well as employers, the focus is no longer making 
leave worthwhile for the employer, but whether individuals have earned coverage, 
meaning the entitlement net can be spread more widely. As all employees are 
required to pay a levy, employees are a self-defining group - those who have paid 
levies for a requisite number of weeks can be easily covered. Problems with 
85 Council of Trade Unions "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Paid Parental 
Leave Bill 1998" (45) 21 . 
86 
Household Labour Force Survey (1997) in Council of Trade Unions "Submission to the Social 
Services Select Committee on the Paid Parental Leave Bill 1998" 14; Else, above n 83, 67-68. 87 
Council of Trade Unions "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Paid Parental 
Leave Bill 998", 21. 
88 
The development of this in social and employment policy is traced by Simon ash, above n 9, see 
especially 1-2. 
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multiple jobs, contractors, and the self-employed are also avoided. Part-time 
workers can receive entitlements on a pro rata basis, as occurs with ACC. 
Even by with a wide definition of employment, social insurance still excludes many. 
namely, the 155,000 women at home looking after children. Home-makers pro\ ide 
services which, were it not for the domestic setting, would be compensated in the 
market. Their exclusion is due to traditional definitions of the labour force which 
ignore domestic work as it does not produce surplus value (profit) for the market 
(' 
and consider reproduction part of nature rather than a productive activity. 9 
The exclusion of these women is a trade-off for a labour-based system. In effect, a 
universal payment with the broadest entitlement possible is not a realistic option. a 
budget constraints will require a low payment or targeting, both of which involve 
problems. 
(a) Low payment 
When payments are low or token, paid leave becomes 'yuppie welfare·: only 
capable of being used by those who have other resources available (such a a partner 
with a moderate to high income) which allow them to undertake childcare for the 
period themselves. For example, in Canada, all employees91 having a child are 
eligible, but payment is only 57 per cent of the individuars average weekly 
insurable earnings, up to a specified maximum. There is also a two-week stand-
down during which there is no payment. For those on low income , a payment of 57 
per cent will be cursory and will probably not allow them to take the leave, meaning 
they ,vill have to leave the labour market and receive a government benefit or return 
to work early if they can make childcare arrangements.n 
89 Marilyn Waring Counting for Nothing; What Men ial11e and fiVhat Women are Worth (Allen & 
Unwin, Port icholson, 1988) 22. 
90 For example, payment for surrogate pregnancy is seen as immoral and outlawed in ew Z aland and 
many other OCED countries. See Waring, above n 89, 23-24, 153-158. 
91 
Canada's payment to only those in the labour force makes it either a general welfare or social 
insurance scheme, but the example serves to illustrate the effect of token payments. 
92 
Nash, above n 9. 10. 
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(b) Targeting 
Targeting is the directing of a benefit to a particular group, for example, those who 
fall between particular income bands. It can be an appropriate way to avoid a token 
payment, spread resources and ensure meaningful paid leave. However, thresholds 
are often set so low that many do not benefit and thus the societal objectives of paid 
leave will be unachievable. The maximum threshold for the Taxation (Parental Tax 
Credit) Act is less than the average family wage in Auckland and Wellington,93 so 
only 45 per cent of families (26,000 a year) receive any of the $150 a week credit. 
This is still more than the 22,000 families a year assisted under the Paid Parental 
Leave Bill,94 but that payment would have been more substantial. 
Targeting allows politicians to argue that the needs of low-income families are 
already met by existing social welfare benefits. This is common in New Zealand, as 
the statement by Prime Minister Jenny Shipley at the introduction of Harre's Paid 
Parental Leave Bill shows;95 
The fourth issue that I want to put to the House, at a time when we may need to make 
an economic choice, is whether a country like our own, where there is free maternity 
care and an extensive childcare system that in the main is targeted, should introduce paid 
parental leave for women who clearly have significant incomes ... There is also a series of 
measures that take into account low-income families, such as family support, the 
guaranteed minimum family income, and the independent family tax credit. 
Under the guise of targeting, ' universal' welfare payments may then be limited by 
eligibility criteria. Because welfare models provide payment as a ' right,' drafters 
may provide payment only to those perceived as deserving of the right. For example, 
compare these statements from the introduction of the Taxation (Parental Tax 
Credit) Act, which is available to low income working families who are not 
receiving a benefit, student allowance or ACC: 96 
93 Rt Hon. Michael Cullen (20 May 1999) 577, NZPD, 16652. 
94 Hon Bill English (National MP for Southland) (20 May 1999) 577, NZPD, 16044. 
95 
Prime Minister, (National MP for Rakaia) (9 September 1998) 5 71 NZPD, 11868 
96 
Steve Maharey (Labour MP for Palmerston North) (20 May 1999) 577 NZPD, 16646; Hon David 
Carter (National, Associate Minister of Revenue) (20 May 1999) 577, NZPD 16647. 
The Opposition: The Government has got to stop singling out beneficiaries as if their 
children do not matter. It is only, they say, ifwe are in the paid workforce that anything 
can go to those children. Beneficiaries' children also need this kind of cash in their 
parents' pockets as well, but once against the Government has singled out those people 
to punish them and not give them anything. 
The Government: I proudly support the Taxation (Parental Tax Credit) Bill. It is a 
tactic aimed specifically at the people who need it. We are talking about Kiwi mums 
and dads on low to middle incomes. They need the assistance and they are the people 
this package is directed at. 
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Thus, despite the 'universal' nature of a welfare payment and its societal objectives, 
in reality the majority of those having babies may be excluded, with payment going 
to those meeting the value-based criteria of the drafters. 
C The Benefits of Mandatory Paid Parental Leave 
The mandatory nature of social insurance remedies the inefficiencies and inequities 
of market provision. Proponents of law and economics view the market as the most 
efficient resource allocator, and thus argue that mandated paid leave creates 
inefficiency by limiting the ability of employers and employees to select the optimal 
salary package. 97 Firms will suffer efficiency losses if the costs of providing leave 
exceed the benefits, and will seek to pass this on to consumers. 
However, the market may not operate efficiently in this regard without regulation. 
Those negotiating employment contracts may not adequately value the positive 
externalities of paid leave, such as increased productivity and gender equity. 
Inefficiency then results as there will be an underprovision of female labour. 
Employers will lose experienced workers and be forced to hire and train new 
employees, the cost of which, as illustrated earlier, is often more than the cost of 
providing leave. 98 
Mandatory prov1s10n may also prevent inefficiencies by avoiding adverse 
selection. 99 Workers will have a greater knowledge of their probability of having 
97 
The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave, above n 56, 3. 
98 
Illustrated by Shell International New Zealand, even for salaries of $30,000. 
99 
Parental Leave Policies above n 56, 7. 
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children (and so taking leave) than their employers. Individuals with a high 
potential of using paid leave will disproportionately be attracted to work for 
companies providing it, '00 which will increase the costs for those firms. In a 
competitive labour market, employers will need to compensate by decreasing wages, 
and thus people with a low probability of taking leave will shun these firms to avoid 
losing earnings. 10 1 This results in segregation, particularly sex-segregation, in the 
market. If paid leave is available for all employees, adverse selection will be 
avoided. 
Further, even if these problems are avoided and the market operates efficiently, it is 
not a perfect instrument. Despite the arguments of some economics scholars, 102 the 
market will not stop discrimination. Even where retaining female labour or 
promoting women with childcare responsibilities can he shown to create benefits, 
some employers will not implement paid leave because the ' perfect information' 
their decisions rests on consist of irrational stereotypes and value judgements. 
Delgado argues that stereotypes do not so much operate irrationally in an otherwise 
sound market, but create a world with irrationality built into it's structure.103 They 
are not irrational individual actions but a market process; " [i]ndividual 
actions ... work in concert eluctably to reinforce the racial status quo. It feels like 
freedom, like individual choice. Yet the effect is tyranny". 104 Social insurance, as 
with other mandated models, does not rely on the market to recognise the benefits 
of paid leave, but pro-actively implements it. It may also, with the help of education 
campaigns, encourage the acceptance of paid leave as an employment right that 
provides comparable benefits for the employer 
100 The provision of paid leave is only one factor in an employment decision, but it may weigh heavily 
between evenly balanced firms, or for people who are intending to utilise it soon. 
10 1 Parental Leave Policies in Europe above n 56, 7. 
102
Criticised by Richard Delgado in "Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of 
Race" (1992-3) M Law Rev 1183, 1196. 
103 Delgado, above n 102, 1196. 
104 
Delgado, above n 102, l 196. 
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V THE ADVANTAGES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 
A Increased Labour Participation 
Social insurance increases women's participation in the workforce by maintaining 
employees' connection to the labour force, providing a financial incentive to return 
to work after three months (by finishing the payment) and by providing subsistence 
so they are not forced to take up a government benefit. Social insurance increases 
these general effects of most paid leave systems by providing a payment adequate 
for people to take leave, and by increasing the amount of people able to receive it. In 
contrast, tax credits, which do not provide actual cash in hand to sustain the 
caregiver, or a low paid entitlement (such as under general taxation) will force an 
individual to return to work if childcare is available, or more likely, to drop out of 
the labour market, and will probably decrease workforce participation by 
caregivers. 105 
Where [social] insurance schemes that rely on specifically allocated financial resources 
and medical services are generally able to guarantee effective cover, systems based on 
welfare, when applied to broader sections of the population, can only offer modest 
benefits. 
This is apparent in a comparison of Sweden, five United States states, Australia and 
the United Kingdom by the Ministry of Women's Affairs in 1995. 106 In Sweden 
(well-paid social insurance) and the five United States states (well-paid disability 
insurance) there was good access and entitlement to leave, and only 7 per cent and 
12 per cent of women having a baby left the labour force or become unemployed. In 
the United Kingdom and Australia (at that time the United Kingdom had a low paid 
social insurance model, and in Australia only some employees were covered) 
attrition rates from the workforce were 55 per cent and 40 per cent. 107 The 
comparison illustrates that it is not so much the type of model that increases female 
labour participation, but the sufficiency of the payment and the breath of coverage. 
105 
ILO, above n 70, 78 . 
106 
Parental Leave; Women and Labour Markets above n 26, 19. 
107 
Parental Leave; Women and Labour Markets above n 26, 53 . 
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European research by Christopher Ruhrn shows that paid leave models raise the 
employment of mothers with infants by affecting a women's real wage. 108 For 
example, suppose a caregiver would like to spend five, unpaid, months at home after 
the birth of her baby. If she is offered three months of paid leave, she will take the 
shorter, paid leave time and return to work earlier, if the benefits of returning to her 
previous employer (for example retaining seniority) outweigh the costs of 'losing' 
two months at home. Ruhrn' s study of 14 European countries, which almost all 
offered forms of social insurance showed paid leave increased 'employment to 
population' [EP] ratios rose by approximately four per cent for all women, and for 
women of childbearing age of approximately nine per cent. 109 
It could be argued that all mandated labour models will have this effect because 
individuals will increase their labour supply prior to having children in order to meet 
eligibility criteria. 11 0 However, most of the increased participation in Ruhrn 's study 
resulted from increases in the return to work rate after birth. 111 
There are caveats on this. Ruhrn' s study may overstate the impact of parental leave 
in increasing employment, as it is difficult to isolate the effects of mandatory leave 
from other "family-friendly" policies, and there may be other factors (such as a rise 
in living conditions), which simultaneously encourage women into the labour 
market and create political pressure for mandated leave.112 
Another important benefit of paid leave is the retention of skilled employees by 
particular employers. Individual employers benefit from a greater proportion of 
experienced employees, with their new skills learnt while parenting, institutional 
knowledge and higher productivity. Labour models have higher rates of return to 
108 1he Economic Consequences of Parental Leave above n 56, 5-6. 
109 ]he Economic Consequences of Parental Leave above n 56, 30. 
110 
The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave above n 56. 
111 
The Economic (' onsequences of Parental Leave above n 56. 
112 
"Additional Official Advice" above n 2, 7. 
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original employers than welfare models, as the bond between the employer and 
employee is maintained during the leave period.
113 
For example, Xerox in England introduced a policy providing a maternity break of 
four months with the continuation of all terms and conditions, including salary and 
benefits. The policy increased the rate of return from 20 per cent to 80 per cent and 
reduced leave absences from nine months to five months duration. 
114 It also saved 
1,838,000 pounds in replacement costs. 115 
It is possible that a well-paid voluntary employer leave payment, as Xerox offered, 
will have the largest return to work rate, because the 'good employer' element is 
highlighted. However return to work rates will only be improved for the employees 
obtaining leave. Those who are not entitled will have less loyalty and less of a 
genuine choice about returning to work; their lower return rates will reflect this. In 
contrast, social insurance allow return to work rates to be higher for the greatest 
amount of people, and at the same time retain the link between employer and 
employee, because individuals recognise that their employer and their own 
employment status contributes to that leave. Again, other leave models will not 
cover such a wide group of people and will therefore have a lesser effect. 
B Treatment as an Individual 
The reliance on contributions from all employees allows social insurance to treat 
contributors equally, and as individuals. Where entitlement is based on family 
income, alternate family structures may be penalised. For example, the Taxation 
(Parental Tax Credit) Act measures entitlement by family income. Greatest benefit 
goes to families where the father works and the mother stays at home. If the mother 
is the primary caregiver after birth, there is no loss of income and the family can 
claim the tax credit. Where both parties work, there is the loss of the woman's 
11 3 Laila Harre, "Paid Parental Leave" Speech at Victoria University, 21 April 1999. 
114 Work and Family File (EEO Trust), Auckland, New Zealand, March 1999, 4. 
11 5 Work and Family Fife (EEO Trust), Auckland, New Zealand, March 1999, 4. 
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income and some return from the credit. If the mother is the income earner in the 
family or is a solo parent and she takes time off after the birth, the family becomes 
dependent on a government benefit, even if only temporarily, and the parent will not 
qualify. Laila Harre has said: 11 6 
The Bill that the Government is proposing fundamentally misses the point of addressing 
discrimination in the labour market. It states that the position of an individual woman in 
the labour market is irrelevant, and that all that is relevant is her family income. So if 
the woman is ghettoised into low-paid, low-status employment, and she is forced to give 
up her income as she must when she has a baby, at least for a time, that is irrelevant, 
because if her bloke is doing OK then she must be doing OK too. 
C Men 
Social insurance may allow men to benefit from paid leave more than other models 
do. Strong peer pressure exists against men taking parental leave. A genuine choice 
about who will be the primary caregiver, or how parental leave will be shared can be 
prevented by gender specific legislation and traditional social values. Men thus miss 
out, as a rule, on the bonding relationship with their child that the principal 
caregiver enjoys, and are seen as less competent at looking after children.117 
Social insurance can be drafted in a gender neutral way that does not assume the 
mother is the primary caregiver. Because of the government's involvement, and the 
contribution by all employees, the government has a part in ensuring the fund ' s 
effective utilisation by all parents. Education campaigns run by the Swedish 
government have significantly increased the number of Swedish fathers taking 
leave, 11 8 and such a campaign could be successful in New Zealand. 
There are several financial reasons why a social insurance model provides the 
greatest benefits for men. First, it will not be a universal payment that must be 
targeted or lowly paid. This avoids the concern of the International Labour 
11 6
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Organisation, which warned that low, flat-rate parental leave is viable for only upper 
middle class, two parent families. 119 
In the majority of cases, fathers take parental leave only when a relatively high level of 
compensation for loss of earnings exists. Taking into account that occupational and 
wage structures still tend to favour men, the loss of the father's income places a heavier 
burden on the family, making it difficult to cope. 
In this way, paid leave will maintain, rather than decrease gender inequities in the 
market. Social insurance, by using an income related, decent payment, will avoid 
this. 
Further, receiving an adequate payment reduces financial stress on both partners, 
and the extra labour participation this often entails. Overseas studies have shown 
that where the Joss from the female caregiver's wage is substantial, their male 
partners often have to increase their time in the labour market, with consequently 
less time available for the family and the new child. Fathers of young children are 
far more likely to work overtime or moonlight than similarly situated men without 
h"ld 120 young c 1 ren. A comparison of fathers under Britain' s low paid social 
insurance with those under France's highly paid general taxation and tax credits 
shows that: 121 
Perhaps to make up for their wives lost wage, more than 75% of British men with 
children under age 10 work more than 40 hours a week, and nearly 1/3 work more than 
50 - nowhere else in the EC is the difference between mothers and fathers hours so 
great. Not surprisingly, fathers hours in France are among the shortest; just under 1/2 
work less than 40 hours a week. Who says childcare is just a women's issue? 
D Lessens Discrimination 
When employers shoulder the total cost of leave, such as under mandatory employer 
provision, women, as the main users of paid leave, become more expensive to hire. 
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Discriminatory hiring practises may result. Social insurance, disability insurance, 
and employer levies minimise discrimination as levies are paid on all employees. 122 
This means that in the first instance, the cost of hiring a women or a man in relation 
to paid leave is the same. 
Under social insurance, (and disability insurance and employer levy models), 
employees will still face an extra cost in hiring women due to the compliance costs 
involved when workers take paid leave. These are unlikely to be large enough to 
encourage employers not to hire women, as they are outweighed by the costs of 
losing the benefits of women workers, and the potential penalties for breaching anti-
discrimination legislation. 
Discrimination against women 1s unlikely to result from voluntary employer 
provision, as employers will simply refuse to provide leave if it is not in their 
interests. In the welfare models, as the costs of paid leave are not borne by the 
employer, demand for women's labour will remain unchanged, assuming that the 
(possibly) higher taxes funding paid leave do not force employers to cut their labour 
force. 123 However, if unemployment does result, marginal employees, a group that 
women are over-represented in, will suffer the most. 124 
There are still labour costs involved in social insurance. First, the increased female 
labour participation rate will impact on the labour rates of other groups used to fill 
those jobs and vice versa. 125 Dowd states that racial minorities will be negatively 
affected for this reason.126 A Ministry of Women ' s Affairs states the Department of 
Labour have predicted that: 127 
Based on international experience and models for assessing impacts from increases in the 
costs of labour, it has been estimated that imposition of an employer levy of 0.21 %-
122 As the Maternity Protection Convention (Revised 1952) art 4 requires. 123 The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave above 56, 7-8 . 124 
Nancy Dowd "Envisioning Work And Family; A Critical Perspective on International Models" 
[1989] Harv J Legis 311 , 346. 
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0.28% may result in a loss of 700-950 jobs across the labour market, with 600-800 of 
those jobs being concentrated among women. 
The Ministry itself does not appear to support this, and goes on to state: 
128 
Given that over 90% of employers would, on average be expected to face annual costs 
of loess than $750 in levies, this cost alone would be unlikely to have a significant 
impact on decisions to employ more staff(or reduce staff) for many of those firms . 
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Even if the Department of Labour is correct, job losses will not be as great under 
social insurance, which will have smaller levies for employers. If unemployment 
does occur under social insurance, paid leave, as an employment benefit, must be 
seen in the same way as the minimum wage - possibly likely to cause job losses, but 
necessary for the protection of the vast majority of workers. 
E Those Benefiting Share the Burden 
One of the greatest advantage of the particular social insurance this paper advocates 
is that those gaining the greatest benefits share the costs. The social insurance 
scheme should be funded by contributions from employees, employers, and the 
government. Although proportioning contributions is outside the scope of this 
paper, it is posited that the greater amount should be paid by employees and 
employers, (relatively) equally, with the government making a smaller contribution 
aimed at administrative costs and in recognition of the societal benefits of paid 
leave. 
I The government and society 
Society will bear the financial costs of paid leave most directly under general 
taxation and tax credit models. Tax credits cost relatively less - $29 million per year 
is forecast under the Taxation (Parental Tax Credit) Act for eight weeks entitlement 
128 
"Additional Official Advice", above n 21 , 4. 
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(remembering that only 45 per cent of those having children are covered). 129 
Labour's general taxation policy is rumoured to be budgeted at approximately $50 
million for eight weeks entitlement (this would also probably be targeted). The 
government's contribution under social insurance will be somewhere between these. 
While the costs of an employer funded model (such as a levy, or mandatory 
employer provision) rest solely with an employer, society will contribute through 
enforcement and administration costs, or when employers seek to recover costs. 
While these will be small, society cannot assume that by avoiding direct 
contributions to paid leave it will not suffer financial costs in some form. 
Paid leave has the potential to provide the government with substantial social 
welfare savings by reducing the demand for more long term social welfare benefits 
and decreasing health costs.130 Social insurance increases this saving by wide 
entitlements. A well-paid general taxation scheme would probably have the most 
benefit however, because the government can target payment to those who would 
not otherwise be on a benefit and who have the greatest need. Labour models do 
not easily allow such focussing as provision is not as directly under the control of 
the government. This means general taxation, properly managed, could get the 
greatest results for the least financial outlay. 
Further, in the long term, social insurance will increase the government tax take~ by 
increasing the return to work rates and paying a higher level of payment than many 
other models, it increases family income. 
However, leaving matters so directly to the government does have risk as paid leave 
may become a macroeconomic tool. Countries tend to expand parental leave during 
profitable years, and reduce it during recessions. 131 Models directly under 
government control, such as general taxation, have the greatest risk of this, but 
129 
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government's overseas have shown they are not immune to tinkering with social 
insurance where there is a government will or political pressure to reduce business 
costs. Similarly, employers may fluctuate voluntary employer provision depending 
on business circumstances. 
2 Employers 
As stated earlier, employers gain sizeable benefits through paid leave, but many 
either do not realise this at present or feel unable to offer paid leave due to the initial 
cash outlay. Social insurance, as a mandatory model, overcomes the first problem, 
and deals with the second by dispersing the costs over all employers. 
Using a general levy enables the cost to employers to be kept low. Levies are 
predicted to be $1. 50-$1. 85 a week per employee under an employer levy model,. 132 
Under disability insurance this will be higher to account for profit margins and the 
extra costs of several providers, including advertising. Social insurance will have a 
lower levy for employers than either of these because employees and government 
will share in the costs. 
3 F:mployees 
Employees benefit from social insurance, because as long as they meet the low 
eligibility criteria, they are guaranteed paid leave for a set time, at a reasonable 
percentage of their wages. Those who were not eligible or were unable to negotiate 
paid leave earlier gain a genuine choice about whether to stay at home temporarily, 
supported by this payment, and gain the health and other benefits that paid leave can 
offer. 
While those previously unable to access paid leave gain the greatest benefit from a 
mandatory system, employees who already receive paid leave also benefit. 
132 
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Negotiating paid leave in a competitive job market such as New Zealand can lead to 
a prisoner' s dilemma. 133 Malin argues employees seek wage increases not only to 
increase their absolute earning powers, but also to improve their status in 
comparison to others. An employee who values paid leave, offered the choice 
between X dollars without leave, and X-Y dollars with leave, will take the latter 
option where the wage lost is less to the employee than the value of the leave. 
Salary also buys relative standing compared to others, and if the worker is more 
concerned with this than paid leave, they will opt for the higher salary and hope 
other workers take the lower salary and paid leave. This leaves the worker with 
more money and thus more standing. 
However, if all workers are rational, all will take this option, leaving them with 
higher incomes but no gain in relative income and standing. If workers collude to 
opt for lesser pay with leave, all retain social standing and gain the preferred 
package, but each has a strong incentive to cheat on the agreement to achieve 
greater relative income. More obviously, individuals may not receive the agreement 
of other workers, some of whom may be childless and not desire leave. To retain 
relative standing, this would force the worker to opt for higher pay without leave. 
Employer flexibility under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 allows the employer 
to ' divide and rule' employees using this dilemma, to prevent agreements between 
employees, and to force contracts on individuals. 134 
While Malin ' s argument represents a stereotypical model of value 135 and workers ' 
priorities, it is true that bargaining penalises employees who value family 
commitments and seek recognition of this in their contracts. 136 It will be most often 
women seeking to negotiate for paid leave in their employment contract, and where 
this is agreed to, it may be at the expense of other terms and conditions, as 
t 33 M 1· b am, a oven 117, 1070. 
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employers will resist paying employees more than their "perceived value". 137 By 
legislating mandatory paid leave and requiring contributions from employers, social 
insurance avoids this, and employers and employees remain free to negotiate extra 
entitlements. 138 
While it is true that current employment law does not actually restrict employees from 
negotiating satisfactory conditions, neither does it require that family considerations be 
taken into account. Instead, a focus on procedural equity in bargaining has often had 
the effect of unfairly penalising employees who have competing priorities outside the 
workplace, and who sometimes cannot give their absolute attention to their employment 
commitments. Those wider demands are not recognised or allowed for in legislation, 
despite their impact on employment, because they are seen as part of the private lives of 
employees, and therefore, are not the state' s responsibility. 
The biggest difficulty with requiring employees to contribute is that not all will 
benefit. There are many employees who will never have children, or are past 
childbearing age, and under social insurance they share the burden with those who 
gain the benefits. There could be a backlash from groups against the introduction of 
such a model , or towards their co-workers who take paid leave. Subsidisation is a 
problem with all the models where the cost is dispersed, leaving only the mandatory 
and voluntary employer provision models where non-beneficiaries do not pay. By 
combining paid leave with ACC this problem is tempered as all contributors are 
likely to have use of one of the systems. 
The benefits of a social insurance model can be seen to have many facets. 
Increasing the female labour participation rate, treating people are individuals, and 
reducing discrimination against men all reflect the goals of paid leave, namely to 
address the work-family conflict and provide for gender equity. Spreading the costs 
among employees, employers and government recognises that these groups share the 
benefits of paid leave, and maximises the advantages of social insurance. 
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VI THE POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 
While social insurance is the most appropriate model for New Zealand, it has 
several potential disadvantages, which, if prepared for, may be avoided. 
A Bureaucracy 
A national social insurance scheme that receives payments from three sources will 
necessarily need a strong administrative structure. Any such system runs the risk of 
becoming an inefficient bureaucracy. This problem is not unavoidable, and is due to 
regulatory capture rather than the model itself Left to private providers, there may 
actually be more bureaucracy than under social insurance, as the government will 
need to use enforcement mechanisms to ensure that payments are made. Otherwise, 
the collapse of an insurance provider, or the failure of an employee to pay premiums 
could reduce the efficacy of the scheme. Further, private providers will presumably 
attempt to differentiate their paid leave packages. This may create flexibility and 
competition, but it could result in different qualities of paid leave being made 
available for those who can afford higher premiums, or show that they are unlikely 
to access the leave, and those who cannot. This will replicate the inequities of 
voluntary employer provision explored earlier. 
To avoid bureaucracy lessons may be learnt from the many international social 
insurance models (remembering that these may operate in different welfare 
systems), and our ACC system. The complex regulatory problems of ACC centre on 
difficulties in assessment, lump sum and long-term payments. The administration of 
paid leave will not be as complicated as ACC. Paid leave will be for a defined 
duration at a set percentage of wages and will not require discretion in entitlement. 
If compulsory ACC is re-introduced, as Labour is pledging to do, scope exists to 
integrate ACC and paid leave under social insurance. This would allow substantial 
savings and the rationalisation of structures. 
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B Compliance Costs 
Compliance costs for businesses will be part of any model, with the exception of tax 
credits and general taxation. Administration costs for social insurance include bank 
charges, record keeping, and potentially, collection costs, which in previous years 
ACC charged approximately $27 million a year for. 
139 By merging ACC and paid 
leave, social insurance would rationalise these charges. For small businesses, the 
initial payment of the leave can cause cash-flow problems. These, and the 
compliance costs, could be dealt with by recompensing small employers at 104 per 
cent of their costs, and large employers at 92 per cent, from the central fund as 
occurs in Britain. 140 
C Perpetuates Stereotypes 
I Same or :.pecial treatment? 
Social insurance treads a fine line between minimising discrimination against 
female employees and recognising the uniqueness of pregnancy. There is debate 
regarding how paid leave should approach the support required by women after 
pregnancy. Same treatment, used by disability insurance, argues that pregnancy is 
analogous with other temporary illnesses that cause workplace absences. 
141 Special 
treatment, utilised by the other paid leave models, advocates the uniqueness of 
pregnancy requires it to be covered by a separate paid leave entitlement. 142 The 
debate between same treatment or special treatment becomes a conflict between 
gender neutral policies that recognise men but may not cater adequately for women, 
and special treatment policies that may reinforce gender roles and perpetuate 
public/private sphere distinctions. 143 
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Disability insurance employs a 'equality as same treatment' ideology that fits with 
our legal systems' classical liberal equality ideal. 144 Such a model works well for 
gaining access to traditionally male prerogatives within the public sphere, or when 
the goal is the assimilation of women into male institutions but these are not the 
aims of paid leave. Paid leave is focussed not on allowing women into the 
workforce (as they are already there) or accepting a male model of employment 
rights, but on developing an employment situation that allows both men and women 
to balance work and family. 145 
Social insurance and other mandatory schemes almost always implement special 
treatment for women, although they may be written in a gender neutral way. 146 
Inbuilt assumptions about the roles of men and women are reflected in different 
provisions for each gender. For example, as with many overseas countries, our 
PLEP assumes that the principal caregiver is the mother, and the transfer of leave 
entitlements to her partner is at her request, on meeting stricter eligibility 
provisions.147 The Paid Parental Leave Bill would have perpetuated this. 148 
Both same treatment and special treatment have serious problems. By requiring 
same treatment, disability insurance pushes people into existing, often inappropriate, 
niches, rather than examining the structural issues of work and family conflict. By 
redefining pregnancy as a disability, disability insurance frees employers from 
considering other employment/parenthood issues, such as nursing facilities or leave 
to care for sick children. 
Special treatment may recognise the umqueness of pregnancy and the role of a 
caregiver ( of either gender) but it can also reinforce the presumption that the mother 
144
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is the natural principal caregiver who should take time off after the birth.
149 
This 
perpetuates the idea of women as marginal workers who are less reliable, less 
k ISO S permanent, and therefore do not need the same benefits as other wor ers. ome 
employers may find this perception reinforced by their own experiences. In New 
Zealand, as in all parental leave systems, women take the majority of parental 
leave,151 with only a small number of men taking parental leave, although 43 per 
cent take some form of paternity leave. 152 Even in Sweden, where parental leave by 
men is the highest in the world as a result of sex-specific parental leaves and 
massive education programmes, 153 the amount of men taking parental leave is only 
154 25 per cent. 
To avoid the choice between a gender-neutral same treatment model that may not 
adequately recognise women, and a special treatment model that reinforces 
traditional roles and discriminates against men, an ' anti-subordination' analysis may 
be applied. 
Anti-subordination theory is used to analyse power relations in society. 155 An anti-
subordination analysis highlights that the structures of domestic and working life 
provide barriers to women ' s full participation in the workplace, 156 removing 
effective choice from women and diminishing their ability to control their lives. 
Social insurance, as with other leave models, simply accepts this. Anti-
subordination theory focuses on the difference between child-bearing, and child-
rearing. It is obvious that women who have children must take at least some time 
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away from paid work after birth, whereas fathers or other partners may choose to do 
so, but this is not the case for child-raising.
157 
While it is ordained by nature that only women can bear children, there is nothing 
natural about the fact that in many societies women are expected to bear the 
responsibility of raising children alone. Women engaged in wage employment m 
particular face the difficult burden of fulfilling their dual role of mother and worker. 
This is perpetuated as organisational culture remains based around traditional male 
lifestyles, 158 in particular the assumption that workers have no domestic 
responsibilities and sufficient domestic support systems. Attempts by men to 
reprioritise their commitments are frowned on, and women are expected to compete 
in the labour market on men' s terms. 159 An anti-subordination approach to paid 
leave would seek substantive changes to how society values and treats caregiving 
and attempt to make organisations more amenable to family commitments. 
2 Short term advantage, long term disadvantage? 
Social insurance may offer substantial short term advances but in the long term 
hamper women ' s employment status. Some have argued that paid leave is simply 
used as a pressure valve on the labour market, keeping male bias within the system, 
but relieving pressure for change from within. 160 Delgado and Leskovoc argue there 
may be honourable intentions behind leave models, but that men will not feel 
compelled or secure enough to take leave, and women will be encouraged to assume 
parental duties, often by being pressured to leave their jobs.161 
Social insurance could work in this way, as to access the payment, caregivers are 
required to temporarily remove themselves from the labour market. As social 
insurance provides payment without requiring a return to work, it allows pressure to 
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be exerted on caregivers by employers and society to remain at home. This has lead 
Evans and Pupo to warn that the underlying premise of paid leave is promoting the 
mother is the superior caregiver over any other form of childcare, and believe that 
mandatory paid leave will "further privatis[e] childcare" .162 The other leave models, 
with the exception of tax credits and voluntary employer provision, have the same 
problems. 
While social insurance may reinforce stereotypes and presumptions about gender, 
there is no reason it necessarily will be used to control the labour participation of 
women. As shown earlier, social insurance will more probably increase female 
labour participation. To the extent that Delgado and Leskovoc's criticism applies, it 
does so to all paid leave models, with the exception of tax credits and possibly some 
general taxation entitlements, which allow payment even where the caregiver 
remains working. However, tax credits in New Zealand support traditional 
breadwinner/homemaker roles. Thus the discriminatory effects of paid leave are 
perhaps not a mark against the social insurance model but a warning that mandatory 
paid leave is not a panacea for gender equity issues. 
It is more of a concern that social insurance perpetuates the 'mommy track' by 
requiring time off to receive the leave payment, and through the continued attitudes 
regarding women' s domestic responsibilities. The ' mommy track' describes the 
position of women who take-up flexible arrangements when returning to work after 
childbirth, but then find their career progress stunted, with lower promotion, pay or 
benefit opportunities, as they are not seen as able to carry a ' full load' .163 The 
existence of paid leave then obscures the problem, as people may feel the issue (the 
work/family conflict) has been addressed. Delgado analogises this with the 
introduction in the United States of ' neutral' civil rights laws. He argues that by 
appearing to deal with the surface problem, these laws enabled the rest of society to 
162 
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blame Blacks' laziness or lack of intelligence for their failure to progress m a 
. , d' f · 164 society now purge o racism. 
Again, this is a problem for all mandatory labour models rather than social insurance 
in particular. If this argument were followed to its logical conclusion, no mandatory 
paid leave model could be adopted unless by radically changing structures, it solved 
the work-family conflict and provided gender equity. As this appears highly 
unlikely in the short term, measures that do promote benefits for society, while 
moving towards the larger goal, should be adopted. Social insurance is the best 
model for this first step. 
Having said this, employment discrimination can be result from social insurance if it 
is not handled correctly: 165 
Without some more pro-active [legislative] protection, the forms of work which best 
suit employees with family and community commitments will remain those with the 
lowest status and remuneration, and concentrated within a narrow band of industries. 
[internal references omitted] 
For example, internationally Sweden has the most extensive paid leave system, with 
corresponding high participation and return to work rates. Yet occupation sex-
segregation in Sweden is high. The perception that women will take long leave, and 
the reinforcement of gender stereotypes that may occur under paid leave encourages 
the diversion of women into easily replaceable, female-dominated industries. 166 
Again, this is potentially a problem for all forms of paid leave that allow women to 
take time off work. 
Perhaps the best way to avoid this is tax credits, as individual employers are not 
involved at all in an employee's application. The entitlement does not require the 
individual to stop work, and consequently, tax credits can be written in a completely 
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gender neutral way. Social insurance can also minimise this problem by making the 
central fund cover more than just paid leave. In New Zealand, a natural progression 
would be for social insurance to cover both ACC and paid leave. This would lessen 
the negative gender perception involved in taking leave. Education programmes 
urging both parents to share the leave would increase this, as would employee 
contributions, which encourage men and women to think of paid leave as a right 
they have earned by their contribution and their service (rather than purely from the 
largesse of the employer or the government).167 
D Family Values 
Social insurance, as a mandated model and one to which the government 
contributes, is open to state manipulation and the promotion of 'family values' . For 
example, in all the leave legislation and proposed legislation in New Zealand, leave 
has only been available to the mother and her married or de facto spouse. The 
legislative language used prevents spousal entitlements being assessed by a same-
sex partner, or a father not living with the mother at the time of the birth. 168 This 
breaches the spirit and the intent of the Human Rights Act. 169 Specifically, 
commentators overseas have warned of the ability of leave legislation to exclude 
teenage mothers by family orientated leave legislation. 170 While the government is 
very likely to implement majority values through social insurance, this is more of a 
threat with the welfare models, because their goal is to encourage socially beneficial 
behaviour and strong views may be held about who this behaviour should be 
encouraged in. 
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In particular, some states have used both social insurance entitlement and welfare 
models to increase fertility levels. 171 Because social insurance is labour based and is 
self-defining by paying contributions, it is less open to such objectives. By 
implementing a simple payment for a set number of weeks at a proportion of wages, 
rather than for example, increasing payment for each birth, the social insurance 
model is not easily biased towards large families as is common under tax credits and 
general taxation models. 
In fact, social insurance and other labour models can penalise higher fertility. The 
use of employment criteria may penalise short gaps between births, and multiple 
,. births may be inadequately met where entitlement is not increased for multiple 
births. 172 Tax credits and general taxation payments can easily avoid this, and some 
European countries have amended their social insurance criteria to compensate for 
it. For example, France requires two years of work in the preceding five years to be 
entitled to a flat rate payment from the second child on, or two years of work in the 
last 10 years for the third child on. 173 In Iceland, cash benefits are paid for one 
additional month per child beyond the six months paid leave provided for single 
child birth. 174 While these alterations may make the scheme administratively more 
complex, they show that the problems are not insurmountable. 
E Race Issues 
Where social insurance has been implemented overseas, it is largely essentialist. 
Women and families are viewed as undifferentiated categories, and the effects of 
race and class are generally ignored. They are considered only on the fringes, for 
example in targeting issues.175 As a government mandated model, social insurance 
has a large propensity to reflect the values of the majority culture. For social 
171 
Increasing fertility is an objective of paid leave in France and Quebec but appears to influence the 
spacing of births rather than the birth rate. Maureen Baker "Family and Population Policy in Quebec; 
Implications for Women" [1994) CJWL 116 121. 
172 · ' As m presently the case under the PLEP and would occur under the Paid Parental Leave Bill. 173 
"12 Weeks Paid Parental Leave Campaign" Information Kit Sheet 6. IM ' ILO, above n 70, 69. 
175 
Dowd, above n 123, 340. 
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insurance to be successfully implemented in New Zealand, racial and cultural 
differences must be examined, for the model must not cater simply for the majority 
culture. 
First, the most fundamental difference may be in fertility. Maori and Pacific Islands 
women, due to their higher fertility rates (3.32 live births per 1000 Maori women, 
and higher for some Pacific Islands groups compared to 1.97 for all women) may be 
expected to access paid leave more often than others. 176 Yet as the Ministry of 
Women's Affairs points out, other demographic and employment factors will lower 
their eligibility under employment criteria. For example, Maori and Pacific Islands 
women generally have children at a lower age than other women, 177 so are less likely 
to be entitled under paid leave models that require years of service before paid leave 
can be taken, or that restrict short periods between births. 178 
Second, Maori and Pacific Islanders are likely to be over-represented m the 
marginalised, low-skilled workers in an economy, the groups less likely to be able 
to negotiate paid leave, and more likely to be excluded by employment criteria. 179 
By mandating coverage and covering part-time and seasonal workers, social 
insurance will benefit Maori and Pacific Islanders more than other labour models. 
However, as a higher proportion of these groups are unemployed, welfare models 
that concentrate resources on those with low incomes and are not as open to 'middle 
class capture' may be of greatest benefit, particularly as social insurance covers only 
those in the labour force. 180 
176 "Additional Official Information", above n 21, 5. 
177 The peak childbearing age for Maori women is 20-24, compared to 25-29, and their teenage 
fertility rate is twice as high as for the general population. Ministry of Women' s Affairs "Maternity 
Leave/Birth Payments in New Zealand; Advice to the Minister" (Wellington, 21 February 1996) 3 
["Advice to the Minister"]. Paul Callister and Judith Galtry Parental Leave in New Zealand: ls it 
Meeting the Needs of Employees, Employers, and Childcare? (Paul Callister and Associates, 
Wellington, 1996) 14. 
178 
For example the Ministry of Women 's Affairs estimated that 59% of Maori and 60% of Pacific 
Islands women would meet the eligibility criteria ofHarre's Paid Parental Leave Bill, compared to 
64% of Pakeha women . "Additional Official Information" above n 21 5 0 179 
Race Relations Conciliator "Submission to the Social Services Sel~ct. Committee on the Paid 
Parental Leave Bill 1998" (115) 3. 
18° Callister and Galtry, above n 177, 14. 
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Welfare models will not have this effect when as under the Taxation (Parental Tax 
Credit) Act, they define a person's entitlement by their partner's employment status. 
Maori and Pacific Islands families are most likely to be single-parent households, or 
households relying on a female income earner. 181 Thus the use of eligibility criteria 
in welfare models can also disadvantage these groups. 
Third, the biggest danger with social insurance and other mandated leave models is 
that they may fail to provide for cultural arrangements. The Race Relations 
Conciliator has criticised the PLEP and Harre's Paid Parental Leave Bill for only 
allowing transferability of paid leave to a spouse.182 Customary or informal 
d · ( h ") · d 183 a opt10ns w angai are ignore . 80 per cent of all Maori births in 1995 were 
classified as ex-nuptial. 184 This means a higher proportion of Maori mothers may 
need to arrange for alternative care, and flexible provisions that recognise less 
conventional parenting patterns would assist in this. Under the mandated models 
currently proposed in New Zealand, a Maori parent would be unable to share the 
paid parental leave and job protection with the person who will be the primary care 
giver for the child, whether it is a member of her own or her spouse' s extended 
family or otherwise. Voluntary employer provision allows individuals the flexibility 
to negotiate leave packages that most suit them, instead of mandating the views of 
the majority for administrative simplicity or ignorance. However the lower average 
employment power of Maori and Pacific Islands workers means this is not a viable 
alternative. 
There is nothing to prevent a social insurance model from addressing these issues. 
As a labour model, it excludes those not in the labour force, but the net is cast 
widely over employees. Flexible time scales for amassing contributions may 
181 
Unemployment rates for Maori and Pacific Islands men with pre-school age children are twice the 
national average. "Advice to the Minister" above n 177, 3. 
182 
Race Relations Conciliator, above n 179, 3. 
183
Dame Joan Metge and Donna Durie-Hall "Kua Tutu te Puehu; Kia Mau" in M Henaghan and B 
;;!kin Family Law Po~ict in New Zealand (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1992) 70-73 . 
Department of Statistics New Zealand Official Yearbook 1997 (GP Publications, Wellington, 
1997), 116. 
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counter the problems of a higher fertility rate, although younger mothers who have 
not spent a sustained period in the workforce will continue to have difficulties 
meeting criteria. Because all employees contribute to paid leave, all , not simply the 
birth parent, have a right to have the leave transferred to them if the parents desire, 
and the social insurance legislation can provide for this. 
F A Law and Economics Perspective on Social Insurance 
1 Criticisms of social insurance 
Law and economics favours voluntary provision. Social insurance, as with other 
government regulation, produces inefficiencies through bureaucracy, inflation185 and 
by forcing individuals to take actions that as 'rational efficiency maximisers' they 
would not otherwise. Sunstein argues that redistribution by regulation, as social 
insurance attempts, is likely to hurt those it is aiming to help, 186 as the inefficiencies 
created can cause unemployment and make women less competitive in the labour 
market. Further, he argues that it cannot be assumed that regulation will directly 
transfer resources to new parents.187 
However, leaving resource allocation to the market is also inefficient. The market 
works best when it is dealing with consumption goods, for example, what type of car 
to produce or buy. 188 Entitlements like the right to vote, or to paid leave are not 
market commodities and cannot be adequately valued in the market. When the 
market cannot adequately value an entitlement, its ability to make rational decisions 
based on a cost/benefit analysis is impaired and inefficiencies will result from any 
attempts to do so. Parental child-rearing, the ' commodity' in paid leave, is 
considered to have no economic value 189 so the market will fail to correctly 
185 
David Haase "Evaluating the Desirability of Federally Mandated Parental Leave" [1988] Fam L Q, 
356. 
186 S · b unstem, a oven 7, 330. 
187 S · b unstem, a oven 7, 330. 
188 Sunstein, above n 7 6. 
189 ' Waring, above n 89, 22. 
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compensate employees through paid leave. To ensure a suitable provision of paid 
leave, the government must intervene. 
Law and economists argue that where the government wishes to remedy a perceived 
inefficiency or encourage certain behaviour it should use incentives, such as tax 
credits, rather than regulation, and allow the market to react directly to these. 190 For 
example, people who receive the tax credits can decide whether to use these for 
childcare and return to work, or to undertake that care themselves, supported 
partially by the tax credit. Law and economists recognise that tax credits are not 
effective where they have regressive effects, or if the desired behaviour is a 'national 
moral commitment' which cannot be decentralised. 191 In the case of paid leave, 
both of these conditions are fulfilled. Tax credits have a regressive effect unless 
targeted, as those on higher incomes gain the greatest benefit because they are left 
with the greater proportion of disposable income. Second, social insurance views 
paid leave as an employment right similar to the minimum wage requirement - a 
'national moral commitment' necessary for equity and health. Thus again, direct 
government action, is necessary. 
2 Jn support of social insurance 
Law and economics arguments can support social insurance; for example by 
perceiving social insurance as a savings scheme or insurance, or as necessary to 
lessen inefficient behaviour such as free-riding or private charity. 
Social insurance can be conceptualised as a savings fund to which employees 
contribute.
192 
People pay levies while working and gain the benefit on having a 
child. The greatest benefit goes to those on whom the heaviest burden falls - for 
example, a family with more children benefit the most (subject to entitlement 
criteria), but those children will contribute more when they are older. This 
190 S . b unstem, a oven 7, 282. 
191 S . b unstem, a ove n 7 342. 
192 • ' 
Richard Posner Law and Economics; An Introduction ( 4 ed, Little, Brown and Co, Boston, 1992) 
506. 
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argument is valid, but not completely correct for the model this paper advocates, as 
both employees and employers contribute. However, if the value of paid leave to 
employers and society is recognised, the social insurance can be perceived as a 
savings account for them also as the fund receives their payments for the benefits 
that they will gain in the future. 
Social insurance and disability msurance can also be seen as insurance against 
impoverishment following pregnancy. 193 Even middle and high income earners will 
have fixed costs (such as mortgage repayments) such that the loss of income during 
unpaid leave may cause financial stress. It is necessary for such insurance to be 
mandatory as it is not possible to insure against poverty voluntarily. Comprehensive 
poverty insurance is unavailable because it js a ' moral hazard' (it would encourage 
people not to work) and because of adverse selection. 194 Adverse selection means 
only those likely to have children will desire the insurance, raising the premiums, 
and thus makes it unattractive to those unlikely to have children or who have other 
resources available. This raises the premiums still higher, possibly making it 
unaffordable to those in need. 195 Again, social insurance is preferable to disability 
insurance because the non-profit nature of the scheme produces generally lower 
premiums than private providers who can be sure that the policy will be redeemed. 
The mandatory nature of social insurance can be seen as an economically legitimate 
way to prevent free rider behaviour. 196 The reliance of (traditionally) men and 
employers on the unpaid labour of women for childcare is free-riding. 197 By 
mandating payment from all those who gain benefits of this labour, social insurance 
ensures compensation to working caregivers. However, if unpaid childcare is free 
rider behaviour then social insurance should compensate all principal caregivers, 
193 Posner, above n 192, 510. 
194 Posner, above n 192, 51 0. 
195 p b osner, a oven 192, 510. 
196 
Posner, above n 192, 509. 
197 
Posner refers to it as a specialisation oflabour, and states the key component for the production 
and consumption ability of a family is the unpaid work of (traditionally) the wife, as her work allows 
the maximisation of the household ' s total real income by enabling husband and wife to specialise in 
complementary activities. Posner, above n 192 139-140 
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regardless of their employment status. Society must also believe that time at home 
with a child is a social good to be encouraged, and if this is the case, it seems 
anomalous to stop after only eight or twelve weeks. More correctly, this is not true 
free rider behaviour by all men and employers as the parent that remains in paid 
work contributes through the need to support the caregiver and child. 
Mandatory paid leave models prevent inefficiency by reducing the need for private 
charities, which law and economists consider an inefficient way to meet demand. 198 
There is anecdotal evidence to show that insufficient or non-provision of paid leave 
presently results in the use of private charity, for example from relatives and food 
banks. 
199 
A social insurance model will have the greatest effect in reducing this, as 
it provides the greatest coverage (to those not already on welfare), at a reasonable 
level, thus, hopefully reducing the demand for private charity of new parents. 
While law and economics arguments can be used in support of social insurance and 
active government involvement, this does not mean a social insurance model is 
economically efficient. Economic arguments may be found favouring a centralised 
system, but the government still lacks competition and the need to maximise profits 
and thus may not operate a cost-effective system. Disability insurance, by working 
through private providers, may provide this competition, but as illustrated earlier, 
there are many problems with private provision. Potential economic accountability 
by the government is reduced as the task of compensating time off is inherently 
difficult and may defy any cost-effective models. In the government's defence, law 
and economics is only one part of the paid leave analysis, and to define a paid leave 
system purely on economic criteria would fail to achieve many of the social 
objectives of the system. 
198 
Posner, above 192, n 509-510. 
199 
"Parents Under Pressure" The Dominion Wellington, New Zealand 15 April 1999, 9. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
Social insurance, when properly implemented, is the most appropriate paid leave 
system for New Zealand. As a labour model , it tackles the crucial paid leave 
objective of reconciling work and family. By its mandatory nature and wide 
definition of employment, it decreases the equity problems of other labour models. 
The advantages of social insurance are that it increases labour force participation, 
treats participants as individuals, lessens discrimination, and spreads the costs 
among those who benefit. Social insurance has potential disadvantages, including 
increasing bureaucracy, compliance costs, the perpetuation of stereotypes, and 
ignoring racial and cultural differences. The effects of these can be lessened or 
avoided by learning from international and domestic experiences of centralised 
systems, and such disadvantages are clearly outweighed by the advantages of the 
social insurance model. 
The problem remains that social insurance is only one step towards accommodating 
work and family and recognising the changes that have occurred in our society. It 
cannot work to ' cut the head off the revolution ' and obscure the need for further 
changes. 200 
Whether readers agree that my preference for a social insurance model is warranted 
is secondary to my aims. The most important point to note is that the seven models 
outlined here are not substitutable alternatives. All have hugely different effects and 
cannot be used interchangeably for political point-scoring. The many complex 
issues involved in paid leave should not prevent an analysis that takes in the wider 
picture. Paid leave has been postponed for twenty years as politicians and 
committees wait for the ' right time '. 201 It is now time for paid leave to be 
200 
Such as better childcare assistance and facilities . Evans and Pupo above n 162 417 
201 . ' . 
Support for patd parental leave has been expressed by: the Women' s Rights Committee "Report on 
Women' s Rights " [1975] AJHR 32; NACEW Report to the Minister of Labour (1 977) 3; Report of 
the Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion (1977) 195; Anne Hercus in the 
debate on the_ Maternity Leave and Employment Protection Act 1980, (2 December 1980) 436, NZPD 
5518 [that paid leave was a important principle which cannot be afforded at present] ; Marilyn Waring 
addressed, not to win votes, but because a modem labour force deserves and 
requires it. 
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in the same debate (2 December 1980) 436, NZPD 5515 [ supports paid leave, but it is too early and 
the public are unlikely to accept it] ; The Labour Party Manifesto (1984) ["to investigate paid leave"]; 
Working Party Report of the Working Party on Payment for Parental !,eave " (Department of Labour, 
Wellington, 1986) [arguments supported paid leave but at the present time the costs were substantial 
and it was ahead of existing awards] ; and The Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988) 589-590 
[acknowledge the value of paid leave but are not prepared to recommend it at present because of 
financial constraints] . 
APPENDIX ONE 
~ following are examples of paid leave entitlements from employment contracts in 
w Zealand. Note that these are not a cross section of contracts, but a
 selection 
m the minority of contracts that contain such provisions. 
Introduced Women/men Length of Eligibil
ity criteria Other details 
paid leave/ 
payment 
:rbury (1970s) Both 6 weeks 
Paid at sta'.1 of leave . except for ma:e gE~:ra: s:Jff who 
1995 
are paid 6 months after return to work 
1970s Academic 6 weeks Must be mem
ber of Paid whether return or not 
staff: both collective contract 
General 1 month Must be member of 
Paid on return to work 
staff: women collecuve contract 
dand 19i0s Both 6 weeks 
Paid on return to work 
Pre 1990s Both 6 weeks 
Pro rata payment if take less than 6 weeks !eave. Partners 
not eligible if work in public sector and receive payment. 
but are if work in private sector 
Pre 1990s Both 6 weeks 
Payment 6 months after return to work 
;h (Pre 1990s) Women 6 weeks 
Paid at ume of birth;assuming care oi accJ:ea child 
1998 Men 2 weeks 
:nvironment Pre 1990s Both 6 weeks 
Payment 6 months afler return to work 
Pre 1990s Both 6 weeks Must take at least 6 
Payment 6 months after return to work 
weeks leave 
Pre 1990s Women 6 weeks Pro rata basis ii less 
Payment 6 months after return to worK. If ,;ove to part 
than 6 weeks leave taken time work on return . payment is still at lu
tl :1me rate 
Pre 1990s Women 6 weeks Must take a minimum of 
Payment made 6 months after return to work 
6 weeks leave 
and Pre 1990s Both 6 weeks Service of more than 1 
Paid at start of leave. Pro rata if less than 6 weeks taken 
year 
Zealand Pre 1990s Both 2 weeks 
Paym ent 6 months :;fler return to work 
1nic Early 1990s Women 6 weeks Determined on case by 
Maternity grant for some staff. Varies when oa1d. 
case basis 
1995 Both 2 weeks 1 years service. 3 1 week p
aid at end of each leave 
months on leave 
Mid 1990s Both 2 weeks Must take more than 13 1 week paid o
n leaving and the other 2 weeks after return 
weeks leave to work 
Mid 1990s Women 2 weeks Must take 13 weeks 1 week paid at beginn
ing and the other 2 weeks after 
leave return to work 
mily File, Vol. 6, March 1999 2 
e.~ 
ation Introduced Women1men Length ol Eligibility criteria Other details 
paid leave/ 
payment 
Paykel 1996 Both 2 weeks 40 hours each at beginning and during first year al return 
1ce Force 1996 Both 42 days Paid 6 months after return to work 
1996 Women 3 months Full pay 11 2 1•ears service: 60 oer cent 11 18 morths 
service ar,d 30 ~er :en, .: • 2 mor.ths service 
wenes 199? Women Up to 3 Higher level statt Must take 3-6 months leave: 11 longer may not be paid 
Men? months 
1.997 Both 1 week All employees 
Jew Zealand 1998 Both 6 weeks All employees eligible 
for parental leave under 
the Act 
• Buddle We ir 1998 Women 3 months Senior associates Contact with ottice and key clients required. optional fax/ 
modem and PC at home. ability to return pan time 
Tripp Sheffie ld 1998 Both 3 months Panners/principals: 3 
months 
Professional statt: 2 
weeks to .1 mor•hs at:er 
2 years service 
General staff: 1 week 
after 1 year. 2 weeks 
alter 2 years 
lcVeagh McKenzie 1998 Women 3 months Lawyers (previously Also shon notice nanny service nd Co available to panners 
a Limited 1998 3o!h , 'TIOnths Paid on employee·s returr. to work 
Assurance 1998 Both 1 month Bonus paid 3 months after return to normal hours 
1998 Both -4 weeks 3 years continuous Paid 6 months alter return. Can choose 4 weeks leave or 
service lump sum. Also have one weeks paternity leave 
1999 Both 6 weeks t O hours or more per Lump sum paid 3 months alter return to 1·1orK 
·:,eek fo r 12 months 
:t 1999 Both 6 weeks 10 hours or more per Lump sum paid 3 months after return to ·:,ark 
week tor 12 months 
rhouseCoopers 1999 Women Full pay 7 years service. 
for 3 intention to return to 
months or work 
half pay 
for 6 
months 
1ere there are two dates , the one in brackets indicates the original policy and the second date indicates the policy was 
fat that time. Question marks indicate the organisation could not provide the information requested . 
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